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“This is Not a Politburo, But a Madhouse,”
The Post World War II Sovietization of East Germany Up to the 1953 Worker’s
Uprising
Rush H. Taylor
ABSTRACT

The end of World War II brought forth many problems for the allies that had not
been completely resolved by the victors. One of the most important was what to do with
the defeated Germany. Within the first decade after World War II, the division of the
former German superpower had become the front line of the Cold War between the
United States and the Soviet Union. In the first eight years after the war (1945-53) East
Germany, the Soviet controlled sector, quickly became ‘Stalin’s unwanted child’ and was
the first communist country to rebel against the imposed Soviet style socialism. The post
war build up and Sovietization of East Germany was the catalyst for the 1953 East
German uprising, which became the model that other Soviet influenced countries
followed (Hungary, Czechoslovakia).
After viewing internal Soviet documents sent from East Germany to Soviet
Foreign Ministers and reviewing interviews with eyewitnesses, it is clear that the 1953
East German uprising was a worker’s revolt triggered by the ill treatment they received
from the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It was not a popular uprising (a revolt
where much of the population is represented by specific groups).
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Introduction
Within the first decade after World War II, the division of the former German
superpower had become the front line of the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union. In the first eight years after the war (1945-53) East Germany, the Soviet
controlled sector, quickly became ‘Stalin’s unwanted child’ and was the first communist
country to rebel against imposed Soviet-style socialism. The post war build- up and
Sovietization of East Germany was the catalyst for the 1953 East German uprising, which
became the model that other Soviet- influenced countries followed (Hungary,
Czechoslovakia).
The end of World War II brought forth many problems for the Allies that had not
been completely resolved by the victors. One of the most important was what to do with
the defeated Germany. The final design of dividing Germany into sections was a result of
the European Advisory Commission’s (EAC) attempt to ensure the demilitarization and
democratization of the aggressor nation. But the repercussions of such an action turned
out to be much more than the simple rebuilding of a defeated Germany. New sources
have come to the forefront of East German history with the fall of the Berlin Wall. In
1992 Hungary, East Germany and the Soviet Union opened up their archives to historians
and a flood of new material concerning the complete and accurate history of the
communist countries became available.
When the archives opened in 1992, a flood of new material became available to
the public. This has enabled academics to begin the process of analyzing the events
1

surrounding the Sovietization of East Germany that inexorably lead to the 1953 East
German uprising. By piecing together information from these newly available sources (in
my case specifically East German Archives, Hungarian Central Archives, Archives of the
Russian General Staff, and Archive of Foreign Policy of Russian Federation) and recently
produced secondary sources, a new interpretation of the events leading up to and the
ramifications of the 1953 East German workers' uprising is beginning to take form. After
viewing internal Soviet documents sent from East Germany to Soviet Foreign Ministers
and reviewing interviews with eyewitnesses, it is clear that the 1953 East German
uprising was a workers revolt triggered by the ill treatment they received from the
German Democratic Republic (GDR). It was not a popular uprising, a revolt where
specific groups represented much of the population. However, the East German uprising
must be viewed against the backdrop of the rise of the Soviet satellite state that preceded
it.
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Zones of Influence
The treaty that ended the European phase of World War II also ended the
existence of a single unified German state.
The allies had no clear idea during and immediately after the war
concerning what should be done with defeated Germany. Although quite
radical plans for its dismemberment and reconstitution as a number of
smaller states had been mooted during the war, such a scheme had never
actually been approved. The eventual division of Germany four years later
was an ad-hoc, unintended result of the emerging Cold War between the
superpowers, rather than the outcome of conscious Allied policies for
Germany. 1

The victorious Allied powers divided Germany into four zones of occupation (British,
French, American and Soviet). The British, French, and American sectors were located in
West Germany and comprised close to 70 percent of Germany’s total area. The Soviet
Union's occupation zone was comprised of the eastern 1/3 of Germany (known as East
Germany) plus East Berlin. The Allies who controlled West Germany’s fate had
problems of their own: Britain could barely feed their population and the United States
decided punishing former Nazis was less important than containing the spread of
communism. Thus it was that West Germany became an ally in the fight to defend
‘freedom and democracy’ against the evils of ‘totalitarian’ communism. 2
Although Stalin continually said that he wanted East Germany to become a
democratic state, his real intention was for East Germany and the other Soviet satellites
3

(e.g., Hungary and Czechoslovakia) to follow their own national roads to socialism
without obvious Soviet intervention. 3 But, according to Konrad Jarausch, “to most
outside observers, the East German state remained an indistinct country, overshadowed
both by the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union over its own bloc and by the larger size
and economic influence of its Western twin, the Federal republic.”4
From the outset, the Soviets sought to transform their zone into something more
akin to the Soviet mold. “The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) were founded as conscious attempts to develop new forms
of state and society, radically breaking with the Nazi past, and based on explicit political
ideologies and theories of society.” 5 They were in effect tests in reality of opposing
theories of how to create a ‘good’ society.

4

Post World War II Build Up
Following Stalin’s plans, the Sovietization started with the resurgence of the
Communist party in Germany by inserting handpicked party members back into Germany
to revitalize the almost forgotten group. Immediately after the Soviets occupied East
Germany a group of leading German Communist Party (KPD) functionaries was sent
from Moscow to different sections of the Soviet zone of occupation. Walter Ulbricht,
who would become the key politician affecting the future of East Germany, was the head
of the group and went to Berlin; Anton Ackermann was sent to Saxony; Gustav Sabottka
went to Mecklenburg. One Soviet military document indicated “that the work of these
groups was to organize the population in the manner desired by the Soviet authorities
rather than initiate immediately independent German political activity.”6 They were to
establish and organize a newspaper, radio, book publishing and local law enforcement in
their areas. The men were directed to purge the local existing government offices and
schools. The groups were responsible for choosing a mayor for each town and
establishing a central government made up of anti-Nazi personnel.
Though they were not identical in composition they had the appearance of
having been put together according to a formula. Often the mayor was
non-party or had belonged to one of the small Liberal parties before 1933.
His deputy would normally be a communist. A number of appointments
were made on the basis of technical knowledge, there was usually a
sprinkling of Christians, a fairly strong Social Democrat group, and a
strong Communist presence. 7
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This ‘democratic’ East Germany would act as a springboard for the German Communist
Party (KPD) to take control of the country in the future. Since Stalin could not afford to
jeopardize his fragile relations with the Western powers by attempting to create East
Germany as a communist state during the country’s infancy, he decided to ‘Sovietize’
East Germany slowly and somewhat removed from the Soviet Union. To accomplish this
goal, Stalin used Ulbricht to increase the power of the KPD in Germany and to seek out
new members. Ulbricht’s motto was “it must look democratic, but we must control
everything.”8
Stalin knew that communists had played a significant role in German politics. In
1933, the KPD controlled about five million votes and had an active underground
organization. Stalin hoped to re- ignite the East German communist party by placing
handpicked communist officials in positions of authority throughout the GDR. 9
Communists and Social Democrats emerged in towns and cities all over East
Germany as the war was winding down. They were deeply influenced by the twelve years
of Nazi tyranny and oppression. Contact between members in both groups was slight
during the Third Reich’s regime. The organizations attempted to keep functioning
underground, but quickly realized the ferocity of Nazi persecution. 10 This led to small
pockets of Communists and Social Democrats spread throughout the country with no
effective means of communicating with each other or the outside world. In some cases
there were multiple groups in the same town that were unaware of each other’s presence.
When the Soviets arrived in search of communists, they found that many of the
KPD and German Socialist Party (SPD) members were teaching old- fashioned ideologies
that had not been used in the Soviet Union since the late twenties and early thirties. In a
6

report drawn up by the Leipzig KPD in the summer of 1945, it was concluded that the
isolation of party members made it extremely difficult for them to keep up with events
and to interpret correctly the national and international situation. 11
In practice, the Soviets attempted to balance the small active minority with the
passive majority by allowing the minority to get involved in fundamental changes while
not upsetting the general population. The KPD described its main goals in the ‘Appeal’ of
11 June 1945, which declared that, although the entire German population must share
some responsibility for the Nazi’s actions, the majority of the blame would be directed at
“Nazi leaders, their hangers on and accomplices.”12 KPD officials announced that all
essential public services (water, gas, electricity) must be brought under public ownership
and all land owned by the Nazi leaders would be expropriated. All these claims were
aimed at pacifying the general population.
The KPD also assured the East German people that they were not attempting to
‘Sovietize’ East Germany (even though they were). They asserted that all their efforts
were aimed at creating “an anti- fascist, democratic-regime, a parliamentary-democratic
republic with all democratic rights and freedoms for the people.”13 At that point, the KPD
made it appear that they wanted nothing more than to gain the trust of the masses. They
worked along-side other anti- fascist organizations and claimed that they were now a
people’s party rather than an elite group that few were allowed to join.
By trying to appeal to both the active minority and the passive Nazi- influenced
majority, the KPD ended up pleasing neither. It was said: “The political orientation of the
Soviets and the KPD leadership was always in danger of falling between two stools:
neither radical enough for the activists nor conservative enough for the Nazi- influenced
7

masses. As a result, the whole united front strategy was inherently unstable, for it
presupposed a degree of political cohesion in the population that simply did not exist.”14
The KPD and SPD both had problems controlling lower level functionaries
posted to the distant provinces. These men, who had spent the last decade under Nazi
rule, were confused by the new party doctrines. This was important because, if the antifascist bloc could not control them through political means, then they would have to turn
to forceful means of control. One of the many problems confronting the hard line KPD
members was the idea that the party should become a ‘People’s Party’ rather than remain
the traditional elite caste that it once was. Such a transformation could only take place if
the party became open to the working class, farmers, peasants, students, and nontraditional party members. Many established members expressed disgust for this plan
because they spent twelve years under Nazi oppression while the ‘common folk’ had
blindly supported Hitler and his regime. The idea of allowing these people to join the
party now, without recourse taken against them for their actions, did not sit well with the
party elite. 15
In response to this opposition, Ulbricht brought in many young communists and
tactically removed the older communists who would not conform to the new policies. In
Leipzig for instance, “the KPD leadership sent out the instruction that older KPD
members ‘who are no longer so flexible…may not insist on being given posts which are
beyond their capabilities.’”16 One ex-KPD member, Oskar Hippe, said of the situation:
“Many older comrades turned their backs on the party because they were not prepared to
tolerate the policies of Walter Ulbricht…At demonstrations, they watched from the sides
of the streets as bystanders.”17
8

In order to help bolster its membership, the KPD utilized German Communist
Party POWs held in Czechoslovakia by the Russians to revamp the party after the war.
But some (about 30 percent), who were not presented with an accurate portrayal of
occupied East Germany, fled West upon gaining their freedom from their Soviet
oppressors.
The most important factor used to decide which POWs would be released in order
to help rebuild the KPD, was whether or not the prisoner had had ties to the Nazis or to
the Hitler Youth. As one official said: “Particular education is not mandatory, only being
able to write and speak good German.”18
Stalin believed that he would have to revolutionize East Germany's various social,
economic and political factions because the Soviet Union would inevitably once again be
confronted by a revitalized, revived, and hopefully reunified Germany. By letting the
East Germans follow their own path to socialism, Stalin intended that the Soviet Union
would not be cast in the role of a ruffian, but, rather, would be viewed as a "big-brother"
figure who was there to "help” the East Germans to recovery. That plan worked slowly,
but surely, in most of the Soviet satellite countries except East Germany.

9

Creation of the Socialist Unity Party (SED)
In 1945, Stalin sought to merge two of East Germany’s most powerful political
parties in an attempt to create a single unified working class party which he could later
control. In a speech given in November 1945, Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck harped on the
fact that “division within the working-class movement must be replaced by unity.”19 The
unity they had in mind was to result from joining the KPD and the Social Democratic
Party (SPD). Ulbricht and Pieck threatened SPD members that “to disagree with the
Communists’ appeal for unity was to split both the working class and the nation.”20 The
KPD needed the SPD to ensure Stalin’s vision of a united SED.
In April 1946 the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Communist Party of
Germany (KPD) merged to create the Socialist Unity Party (SED) as a result of Soviet
“compulsion and self-deception.”21 On 4 February, Otto Grotewohl, chairman of the SPD
from 1945-46, said: “not only was the strongest pressure being brought to bear on them
personally (he spoke of being tickled by Russian bayonets)…their organization in the
provinces had been completely undermined …there was no point in resisting…the ‘iron
curtain’…had come to stay.”22 Otto Buchwitz, a former leader of the SPD, put forth four
reasons why he thought unification was necessary: First, communist leaders believed that
after the Nazi tyranny, a dictatorship was not possible; second, revolutionary socialism
was the next logical step after the failure of Weimar reformism; third, socialism was
already laid out in Russia and the Western powers wanted to bring back a ‘bourgeoiscapitalist’ order; fourth, even though the Soviets were pressuring the SPD, they had no
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interest in imposing their system on Germany. SPD members also recognized that they
would make up over half of the new party’s membership and, therefore, the party would
be molded to their standards. 23
Unification took considerably longer than either party had anticipated.
Factionalism ran rampant throughout the party. By the middle of 1948, “the SED had
about two million members, some 600,000 of whom were former Communists, 680,000
of whom were former Social Democrats, but over 700,000 of whom had joined only since
unification.”24 As one historian observed, “striking cultural differences remained; for
example, the Social Democrats’ use of the polite Sie for ‘you’, against the communists’
preference for the informal Du in conversation. On the political level two main
tendencies could be discerned: “‘Sectarianism’ on the left and sympathy for the West
German SPD on the right.”25 One former SPD member believed that soon the party
would be reformed and when this happened that many of the ex-SED members would
join the re- founded SPD.
In May 1948 a group of main line former Social Democrats (SD) met at Max
Fechner’s (high- ranking SD member) house to discuss how the two socialist traditions
split the party rather than uniting them and swore to limit the power of the standoffish
Walter Ulbricht. But, in the ensuing weeks, the group disintegrated.
The height of Stalinization in East Germany began with the first party conference
of the SED in 1948, at which the party leadership elected a Politburo that would lead the
party in the direction of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. The SED took a decidedly stronger turn
toward the Sovietization of East Germany. The East German Supreme Court was
established in late 1949 and convicted over 78,000 people of political crimes in 1950
11

alone. 26 Many Social Democrats were quickly purged from the party as the SED called
on its members to expose the bourgeois- nationalist elements because they were enemies
of the state. “Stalin and his followers of the Soviet bloc, such as Ulbricht, threw
overboard the excess baggage of the dissonant memories of World War II and the
Holocaust as they turned the shape of the state around to fight the Western
imperialists.”27 Ulbricht proclaimed the SED a ‘party of a new type’, which referred to a
party based on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, rather than the SED’s previous
tenets. This proclamation proved to be the beginning of the turn from the former ‘German
road to socialism’ to an all out push toward the Soviet model of communism. The party
was transformed from a mass membership party into a cadre party, full of active
revolutionary members. This allowed the SED to purge unwanted or undesirable
members and to control more effectively the admission of new comrades. 28
As the SED implemented new policies, other East German parties were
transformed into instruments of Soviet policy. In June 1948 Ulbricht, used his control of
the SED to rid the party of all those suspected of harboring sympathy for social
democratic ideals. He accused these men of infiltrating the party and sabotaging its
operations. Some people believed that by the autumn of 1948 it was more dangerous to
be a former member of the SPD than an active Nazi. 29 As with the purges in the Soviet
Union, those who opposed the action taken by the SED were imprisoned and sometimes
shot. Between 1948 and 1950 almost 600 members of the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU), a right of center moderately conservative Christian party, were imprisoned. Many
of the captives mysteriously died or disappeared in 1950. 30 Thousands of former and
current SPD members were tracked down and arrested for resisting the new policies.
12

Ulbricht sought young recruits whose minds were still impressionable, rather than
allowing the longtime, powerful, members to express their disgust with the direction the
SED was heading.
In his attempt to bring new members into the SED (including ex-communists who
were scared of joining because of their Nazi pasts), Ulbricht declared in a speech that a
person’s current political attitudes were more important than previous actions:
Today, the measure of who is a peace- loving individual and who seeks
German unity is not what party membership book they had earlier, and
whether or not they belonged to the Hitler party. Rather, the only measure
is: Are you for a peace treaty? Are you against the Atlantic Pact, as a
result of which West Germany would be made into a base for war? Are
you for the unity of Germany? Are you for the withdrawal of occupation
troops following the conclusion of a peace treaty, or are you for a fortyyear occupation and colonization of West Germany? Today, under these
conditions, anyone who raised the question ‘Is this person a former
member of the Nazi party or not’ works against the formation of a
National Front. 31

Getting people to join the SED was not an easy task for Ulbricht. The majority of
Germans who survived the war wanted nothing more than to put food on the table and
attempt to piece their pre-war lives back together. Politics, in their minds, was closely
associated with Nazism and very few were interested in getting involved again. The
shortage of food took precedence over any political aspirations:
The major part of the population still remains politically reserved. In
particular the middle classes, which lived through the period of the
Wilhelmine system and the period of the Weimar Republic to their great
13

disappointment, but which took fresh hope from National Socialism and
which are now witness to the downfall of the National Socialist regime,
have lost faith in everything. Trust in any new political movement does
not yet exist among them. 32
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Soviet Reparations Policy for East Germany
The Soviet Union initially had three main goals in East Germany: “first to equip
occupying forces with the necessary supplies; second to secure the payment of
reparations; and finally to insure the basic needs of the German population.”33 As early as
1943 the Russians planned to take equipment rather than money in satisfaction of East
Germany’s reparations obligations. This was a Soviet version of “industrial disarmament
policy aimed at reducing Germany to an agrarian economy.”34
Post World War II East Germany was not stable economically either. What
became East Germany was historically central Germany. Although not uniform
throughout the region, this area did have a rich industrial base that offered some of the
most advanced technology in the world. Much of the land around Berlin was primarily
agricultural, but within the city there were large concentrations of industry. The East
Germans were famous for their ability to produce the highest quality machine tools and
machines, having provided up to 80 per cent of Germany’s machinery before World War
II. East Germany was also home to important chemical plants located close to Leipzig
and Merseburg which produced dye, film, and synthetic rubber. By the end of the war,
East Germany had the largest chemical company in Germany both in number of
employees and capacity (Leuna plant). 35
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Goals of Soviet Restructuring
Disassembling industrial plants in East Germany and removing them to the Soviet
Union accomplished two of Rus sia’s three goals, by ensuring that Germany could never
attack Russia again and improving Russia’s own industrial base by using German
materials and technology taken from the Soviet zone of occupation. The first problem
was retooling the plants for peacetime production. A second problem was the lack of
research and development to aid in technological innovation. Berlin was home to some
key companies in this field, but the vast majority were stationed in West Berlin. The
foremost companies that did have research and development capacities, like Zeiss (a
world leader in optics), lost many of their top scientists when the American occupation
authorities evacuated the Soviet zone in 1945 (Zeiss lost 84 of their scientific and
technological personnel in the evacuation36 ).
Since many of the major companies were located in West Germany, East
Germany also lost many of its top level managers. In some cases, whole corporations
relocated toward the end of the war. Siemens, for instance, moved from Berlin to
Munich. 37
In 1945 the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) assessed the damage done
to the German economy by allied strategic bombing. It concluded that, although the
collapse of the German economy was due to heavy bombing, the Allies did very little
damage to German industrial capacities. The majority of the damage was inflicted upon
the oil industry and infrastructure systems (rail lines, sewage, water, etc.). Industrial
16

factories had little exterior damage, and even less harm was done to the machinery
inside. 38
The USSBS also found marked regional differences in the amount of damage.
Even though the Soviet zone contained important industrial factories that produced war
materials including chemical and rubber production, comparatively few facilities were
affected by the allied bombing strategy. The GDR only lost 15 percent of its 1944
capacity, whereas the Federal Republic lost 22 percent of its industrial capacity.

39

In

general, the damage to buildings far exceeded the damage to industrial plants throughout
Germany. The majority of factories had the ability to resume production only weeks after
the war ended. Much more damage was done to the East German industrial capacity
when Russia removed whole factories. For instance:
Aluminum and magnesium capacity…was intact at war’s end, but stood at
zero in September 1946. Magnesium-oxide capacity was removed entirely.
Ninety-five percent of automobile tire production plant was dismantled.
Eighty percent of soda capacity disappeared. All of these were sectors that
had survived the war intact. 40

What did the Soviet Union intend to do with these factories? The majority of
facilities that had been designed specifically for wartime production were removed. Their
uses, as they stood, were limited. The machines would need to be retooled and
reconfigured for peacetime production. Also, wartime manufacture was constant, so the
machines and parts used to produce goods would need to be replaced soon because of
their extreme use.

17

Some of the factories that were removed to the Soviet Union were rendered
useless and discarded, but many were put to good use. The Soviets studied plant removal
carefully, so as to figure out which plants were salvageable and which were not.
Therefore, they were much more prepared to remove quality plants and selected their
targets deliberately:
The Soviets concentrated on plants containing equipment and machines
that could be safely transported. Close comparison of removals in
Manchuria and East Germany indicates that almost 100 percent of
removals had high salvage value and were easily transported, i.e., machine
tools, precision instruments, and small items of equipment not made of
fabricated sheet metal. On the other hand, the Western Allies in Europe
appear to have concentrated their removals on plants with relatively low
salvage value.

41

The Soviets focused on machines, not systems. This allowed them to incorporate the
machines into their own pre-existing systems.
The Soviets also seized scientific papers and documents to help further their own
research and development. They also forced large numbers of engineers and scientists to
move to the Soviet Union to work on R&D projects there. According to David Holloway,
“The war provided the Soviet Union with a major infusion of foreign technology, mainly
in form of captured German scientists, technicians, equipment and production plant.”42
Around 3,000 specialists and their families were transported to the Soviet Union and
detained for up to twelve years. 43 Their fields ranged from optics and nuclear research to
aeronautics. This action hindered technological development in East Germany by
instilling fear in the remaining scientists and engineers who saw what would happen if
18

the Soviets thought they could be utilized in the Soviet Union. This caused a large
number of leading scientists and engineers to flee West from the GDR. However, the
industrial losses were only one facet of the Soviet’s plan to transform East Germany into
the German Democratic Republic.

19

Life in East Germany versus Life in West Germany
East Germany was a special case. As a divided country with a divided former
capital, comparisons between the life in the capitalist West and life in the communist East
were impossible to avoid. By 1948 it was clear that the East Germans were very poor in
comparison to their counterparts in West Germany, and the difference in quality of life
between the two was marked. While the Marshal Plan pumped money into the West
German economy, allowing it to expand and prosper, the Soviet Union’s forced
reparation payments had the opposite effect on the East German economy.
East Berliners were reminded daily of the vast difference in standard of living. A
British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent in West Germany observed, “any East
German could go to West Berlin at anytime, by simply crossing into West Berlin . . . ”44
This freedom to travel from East Berlin to West Berlin was a fundamental cause of
dissatisfaction because the experience of visitors to West Berlin served as “the most
powerful propaganda, the effect of the things in the shops, a much better life, better
dressed people, freedom to travel….”45
East Germans became jealous of the wealth afforded to the West Germans and
questioned the East German and Soviet goals for East Germany. The stark contrast in
living standard so close to home obviously acted as a catalyst to spread discontent.
Seeing the difference in wealth inhibited East Germans from ever truly accepting
communist rule. Thus Stalin needed to tighten the Soviet grip of East Germany.

20

Towards Soviet Style Socialism
Believing (and rightly so) that he was losing his hold on East Germany, in 1948
Ulbricht introduced a plan of accelerated industrialization and collectivization in an
attempt to speed up the process of East Germany becoming a socialist nation. This was
the final retreat from his original plan of allowing each nation to follow its own road to
socialism and led to a bout of ruthless Sovietization during which all Soviet satellites
were forced to introduce Soviet economic and political practices. This Soviet style terror
was introduced between 1948 and 1953.
In 1952, at the Second Conference of the SED, an accelerated construction of
socialism was introduced by Ulbricht, which put major strains on industrial workers by
raising their output quotas by up to ten percent. It was obvious that the East German
people were unhappy with the way in which their state was heading. Although the
Soviets had dreams of a united popular front in the west, which would aid the Soviets in
their initial quest for a united Germany, the increased Sovietization created an incurable
rift that inexorably split the two Germanys further and further apart:
Ideological dogmatism created a new political reality, since it meant that
the state had to underscore the importance of an effective security system
which saw a tremendous expansion after 1950. It also found expression in
the tightening of East German criminal codes, such as the draconian ‘Law
regarding the protecting of inner German trade,’ and influenced the GDR
judicial system in the establishment of which Stalin was supposed to have
exercised ‘decisive assistance.’46

21

Many forms of repression were put in place during this time period, although the “class
war” that was instituted in the GDR was more on an ideological level rather than the
bloody purges of most Eastern Bloc nations. The Soviets professed that the elimination of
‘Western, decadent’ influences was intended to be constructive in a certain way - art and
culture of the Soviet Union were a better alternative, while Soviet science “had long
surpassed the science of the capitalist countries.”47 This repression resulted in reactions
by those being subjugated including flight to the West, passive resistance, and acts of
desperation. These reactions in turn brought forth more repressive acts, some in the form
of Soviet Directives.
The Soviet Directives put forth in 1952 were viewed as an illustration of how
outside influences affected the progression of the GDR. Western powers rejected an offer
put forth by the Soviet Union to re-unify Germany on the condition that the new
Germany would remain politically neutral. Stalin said, that “irrespective of any proposals
that we can make on the German question the Western powers will not agree with them
and will not withdraw from Germany in any case. It would be a mistake to think that a
compromise might emerge or that the Americans will agree with the draft of the peace
treaty.”48 Ulbricht and Stalin, therefore, knew that the Western powers would not agree to
their proposal, and the Western powers’ denial allowed Stalin to announce that the GDR
would “have to create its own army and establish agricultural cooperatives.”49
If the West accepted the re-unification of Germany, it would have hindered the
Western assimilation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany).
Ulbricht followed this announcement with another bout of Sovietization, which not only
led to the creation of a ‘people’s army’ and of agriculture collectives, but also to the
22

abolition of the previous states of the GDR, the creation of a centralized administration
along Soviet lines, and the tightening of border controls towards West Germany. There
were two key directives involved in the further Sovietization of the GDR. The first was
the abolition of the private sector in industrial production—from the end of 1952, the
people would own the factories (at least eighty one percent of them). The second was the
collectivization of agricultural production. The state punished landowners by adding new
repressive measures to the transformations. The landowners were accused of sabotaging
attempts to feed the populace. 50
The GDR leadership proclaimed all East German youth were to be prepared to
serve Germany in the form of military service. The creatio n of a new army would
eventually cost the GDR 500 million Deutsch Marks, not including foodstuffs, which
would be taken away from other consumers. 51 The GDR had not planned for the creation
of a military and therefore had not included it in the 1952-53 budget. Money and
specialists, whose expertise was necessary to the armament of East Germany, had to be
taken from other projects. 52
In July 1952 the SED declared that no offices could employ any young men
between the ages of 18 and 24 in an industrial capacity. These men were to serve as
“barracked” police troops. The SED turned to the nation’s young women to fill in the
industrial workforce gap. Although this helped move women toward greater employment,
the economy was still on the verge of collapse because of the cost of reparations
payments the GDR owed the Soviets and the Soviet Directives that were in various stages
of implementation. The SED seemed unable to recognize the growing sense of
dissatisfaction or the reasons for such discontent. Thus further me asures only served to
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further worsen conditions. For instance, the party attempted to relieve foodstuff shortages
by suspending rationing for certain groups, which failed to relieve the specific situation
and only created new frustrations. 53
The number of East Germans fleeing to the West increased from 166,000 in 1951
to 182,000 in 1952. 54 West Germany proved appealing because of the higher salaries and
standard of living caused by the “Korea Boom.” The Korean War led to increased
economic output and urgency in both Germanys, but West Germany offered many more
incentives and money for similar positions in East Germany. In essence, West Germany
was rapidly becoming more established as a productive state with the ability to direct its
own government and people. East Germany, on the other hand, was becoming more
destabilized.
West Berlin acted as a destabilizing catalyst for the GDR, especially among the
youth by offering people an image of a better life for their families. East German youth
traveled across the borders in huge numbers, seeking out all that Western technology and
science had produced (televisions in store windows, record players, etc). Walter Ulbricht
knew that this could be extremely dangerous and stated in June 1952 that any university
student who had connections to the West would be expelled. The death of Stalin on
March 5, 1953 brought a period of even greater uncertainty and confusion.
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Stalin’s Death: A Turning Point
Stalin’s death marked a turning point for Soviet satellites and the future of Soviet
strength in East-Central Europe. When he died, East Germans hoped for change. Stalin
had not selected a clear successor. Therefore the top four or five party officials struggled
to seize Stalin’s position. The post-succession Kremlin power struggle put all external
issues on a back burner during what proved to be an inflammatory time for the satellite
countries, especially East Germany.
According to Sergo Beria, Laverentii Beria’s son, Khrushchev, Malenkov,
Bulganin and Beria came up with a plan for deciding who Stalin’s successor would be.
Beria proposed that Malenkov succeed Stalin, because he had a weak personality and
would be easily controllable. 55 Beria “knew what Malenkov amounted to but considered
that he was good enough for the role he meant to let him play.”56
When Georgi Malenkov was named Stalin’s successor the SED hoped that the he
would answer its cry for help. Ulbricht and the SED had requested aid on numerous
occasions to assist the GDR’s failing economy and in April of 1953 Ulbricht again
requested massive aid infusions to halt the total collapse of the East German economy. 57
The Soviets denied all Ulbricht’s reports as fabrications. When Russia finally
requested its own studies of the mounting problems in East Germany in late April 1953,
the Politburo was astounded. 58
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Problems in the Soviet Satellites
The Soviet study concluded that over 447,000 people had fled East Germany from
January 1951 to April 1953. Many of these refugees were workers, scientists, and youths,
which the SED desperately needed to keep East Germany afloat. A number of these
people were peasants and farmers, which led to 26 per cent of the agricultural land lying
fallow. During a four- month period in 1953 more than 2,700 SED members and
candidates fled. 59 This is important because the SED was the governing party and further
proves that the discontent was pervasive throughout society. The “intensification of class
struggle” was one motivating factor that led to the increase in the number of people
leaving the GDR. 60 These problems were pinned on Ulbricht because he acted as a
dictator rather than as the leader of a group.
In early 1953, the USSR Council of Ministers convened to decide the GDR's fate.
They believed that Ulbricht and the SED had implemented Stalin’s rapid industrialization
plan “without the presence of its real prerequisites, both internally and internationally.”61
The SED forcibly developed a heavy industry which lacked raw materials, restricted
private initiative and revoked food ration cards from private entrepreneurs. They also
hastily built agricultural cooperatives without foundations in the countryside where there
were no supply routes. Additionally, this era of crash socialization was marred by harsh
regimentation and persecution, as extensive arrests and trials accompanying the new
policy added to the pressures on the East Germany socio-economic fabric. 62 Ultimately,
East German production fell as a result of Ulbricht’s industrialization measures.
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The Soviet leadership concluded that it was time for change. Laverentii Beria,
one of the top members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU),
investigated the possibility of allowing the GDR to stray from its present socialist path.
He believed that the GDR had failed to become a socialist state and that now the only
path was one of accommodation. He sought a unified Germany governed by a coalition
government. Beria particularly wanted to get rid of Ulbricht, and personally blamed him
for the failure of the GDR. Beria sought an East Germany that would have an
autonomous government in a re-unified Germany, where both Soviet and Western
influences played an equal role. 63
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GDR not the only problem
East Germany was not the only Soviet satellite that experienced such egregious
problems. Hungary also dealt with many similar issues while attempting to cope with the
ruthless Stalinisation program instituted in 1948. In Hungary, during just a two and half
year period more than 1.5 of 9.5 million people were persecuted much in the same
fashion as East Germans. The army soldiers punished 177,000 in little more than a year,
almost one punishment for every person in the army.
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Nikolai Bulganin, one of the new

leaders of the CPSU, said of the Hungarian situation “This is not the road to socialism,
but the road to catastrophe.”65
Hungary built iron plants for which no country or foreign government had
promised iron ore, a natural resource Hungary lacked. They implemented collectivization
without the appropriate economic base, which led to the collectives having a lower
productivity rate than individual producers. Additionally there were no quality goods in
Hungary because the best goods had to be exported attempting to achieve a balanced
trade, similar to the GDR. 66
Another similarity between Hungary and East Germany was that the Soviets
leadership blamed the top political figure for the problems within the country. It was
obvious to the Soviets that their satellites were inexorably heading for a complete
breakdown. In Hungary, Matyas Rakosi ruled much like Stalin in Russia and Ulbricht in
East Germany. He had no second in command, because he considered the people
surrounding him to be incompetent. In a meeting between Soviet and Hungarian leaders,
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Rakosi could not name his primary deputy because “whenever someone’s name came up,
comrade Rakosi always immediately had some kind of objection.”67 Rakosi blamed his
‘bossiness’ on direct teachings from Stalin. When the Soviets confronted Rakosi about
his dictatorial style he said “regarding hubris, that’s an illness that one cannot detect, just
like one can not smell one’s own odor.”68
Another satellite country that experienced problems was Yugoslavia under Tito
(Josip Broz). Tito was a Croatian communist who devised a political program in 1944
that emphasized federalism and self-determination, which appealed to many. Under Tito,
Yugoslavia was one of very few nations to liberate itself from the German Army. This
accomplishment was possible because Hitler had to move troops from Yugoslavia to fight
on the Rus sian front and also because the Red Army sent direct aid. Tito instituted a
federal structure, as promised. His independent line resulted in Yugoslavia becoming a
key member of the world’s ‘non-aligned movement’ and also led to the country being
excluded from the Soviet orbit in 1949. Ulbricht, as the head of the SED had similar
problems with authority and implementing the Soviet’s plans for the GDR.
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“New Course” equals New Hope
Before the Soviets put forth the “New Course,” they discussed a multitude of
options pertaining to the strengthening of the East German people’s opinion towards the
Soviet Union and socialism. The Soviet Ministers believed it was “crucial to correct and
strengthen the political and economic situation in the GDR and to strengthen significantly
the influence of the SED in the broad masses of workers and in other democratic strata of
the city and country.”69 It was agreed that the recent propaganda about the necessity of
the GDR’s transition to socialism which pushed the party organization of SED to
simplified and hasty steps both in the political and in the economic areas were incorrect.70
The Soviets wanted to get rid of the forced pace toward socialism and thrust the German
peace treaty debate back onto the international scene in order to show East and West
Germany that the Soviets favored a unified Germany. By offering this re-unification to
both Germanys, the Soviets were hoping to improve their relationship with the East
Germans. Malenkov and the Soviet Union realized that the GDR was heading for a
catastrophe. In an effort to pre-empt such an event, the Soviet Union put forth the “New
Course” on June 2, 1953 which guaranteed:
-General amnesty for East German refugees
-Assistance to small and medium size private enterprises
-Liberalized inter-zonal travel
-Eased campaign against the Protestant church
-Reissued ration cards to the middle-class
-Return of German POWs in Russia 71
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Every effort was made to help people who had fled West to come back and get reinstated
in their old positions. Expelled students were allowed to go back to school and make up
exams they missed. Prisoners accused of minor offenses were to be released and those
already sentenced were to be pardoned. 72 The Politburo admitted that “the interests of
certain sections of the population such as small farmers, retailers, tradesmen and the
intelligentsia had been neglected with the result that many people had left the
Republic.”73 This was a major step towards appeasing the East Germans, but it left out
appeal to one major component of the GDR: the workers.
The workers had been upset since Ulbricht’s failed efforts in July 1952 to increase
the GDR’s productivity by raising work norms and quotas. However, the GDR still had
the new quota system in effect during this time of strife. When the “New Course” was
implemented, everyone except the workers seemed to get a break, and the new plan
fomented in these workers hatred against the SED and the Soviets. 74 The East German
workers were fed up with their miserable living conditions and the high reparation
payments owed to the Soviet Union. With the “New Course” as an impetus, the workers
of East Berlin and then East Germany united to strike.
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Worker’s Uprising or Popular Revolt?
Prior to the opening the archives, ma ny people thought the attempted 1953
revolution had occurred because East Germany was fed up with the Soviet style of
government working towards a socialist state. The new archival evidence proved that
many previous conceptions were incorrect.
Earlier there was much debate over the occurrences in the GDR on June 17, 1953.
Many people believed that a popular uprising had taken place in an attempt to overthrow
the SED and install a new democratic form of government much like West Germany’s,
but was crushed by the iron hand of the Soviet Union. Many Soviets believed the West
had caused the uprising by promising support for any and all who took part in the strikes,
so that when the GDR fell, the Western allies would be there to help East Germany form
a democratic society. The Soviet Union used the fact that the strike occurred in about 400
cities simultaneously to support the idea that the West was behind the strike. Some of the
archival evidence points to this as a possibility, as well. Although it became clear from
some documents that there was mass discontent throughout East Germany (proven, if
only, by the numbers of refugees fleeing West), the East German uprising did not
incorporate all of the East German people. Only three to four percent of the total
population was involved. No one really knew what happened because the Soviets and the
SED kept the actual information secret.
The new evidence proved that the uprising was aimed at addressing workers’
problems, not those of the population as a whole. The demographics reveal that
32

somewhere around ninety percent of the 500,000 people involved were industrial
workers. The other ten percent or so was comprised of farmers and, in some cases, school
children supporting the uprising. The workers on strike shouted anti-Soviet slogans,
demanded decreases in prices by forty percent and wanted to liquidate the East German
State. 75 But, with only three to four percent of the total East German population (around
18 million), the strike cannot be a considered a popular revolt against the GDR.
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Was the West a Catalyst?
It seems very unlikely that the West acted as a catalyst for the events.
Discontent among the East German workers was present long before the strikes occurred.
The accelerated industrialization put forth by Stalin in 1948 started a long road of unrest
among the workers. During the Second Party Conference in 1952, when Ulbricht decided
to raise work quotas to catch up to the Soviet Union’s demands, workers lived in abject
poverty in the cities.
At the Second Party Conference, Ulbricht stated “the political and economic
conditions and the attitude of the working class and of the majority of the workers…had
progressed to a point where the establishment of socialism had become the fundamental
task [facing the state].”76 He meant that the process of socialization in the GDR was to be
sped up, as the conditions were prime for such action to take place. Agricultural
collectives were formed soon after this conference, with craftsmen’s collectives close
behind. The GDR was also split up into 14 districts rather than its original five provinces.
This marked the beginning of the GDR’s seclusion from the Western world.
Travel was severely hindered; telephone and roads in Berlin were cut off at sector
boundaries; all who were not outwardly pro-GDR were put under a watchful suspicious
eye. 77
Conflict between workers and the SED began long before the June 1953 uprising.
The first dispute took place in January 1951 when the SED introduced collective
agreements. The SED declared that workers would undertake “both individually and
34

collectively, either to increase their output or to achieve the production target laid down
by the state ahead of schedule.”78 Even with open ballot votes watched over by SED
functionarie s, many factories refused to endorse the new plan, because they thought they
would be worse off under the new laws than under the old tariff arrangements. Many
believed that the focus on heavy industry would be detrimental to consumer interests and
that the collectivization of agriculture created dislocations in the food supply and brought
on mass disaffection.
These early events acted as a precursor to the 1953 uprising. The collective
agreement disputes proved that if the workers stayed united, they could stand up to the
regime. It also demonstrated to the SED that workers were unwilling to follow the
regime’s chosen path. 79 In the following years of collective agreement meetings, almost
no pressure was put on workers and factories. The following year, they were asked to
enter into agreements voluntarily, both individually and corporately.
In 1952, the turn out for the SED Party Conference was much more favorable
than the previous year. As a result, Rudolf Hernstadt, chief editor of Das Neue
Deutschland and a member of the Politburo, used the positive atmosphere to bolster
workers support for the new regime. Hernstadt blamed the 1951 disputes on poor
decision- making by the SED functionaries and tried to show workers that the SED had
made a change for the better. By the start of 1953 though, socialism in the GDR was in
full swing and the SED dropped its conciliatory attitude toward workers.
The Soviet evidence put forth to substantiate the claim that the uprising seemed to
be a major planned uprising covering the whole territory of the GDR, aimed at replacing
the government relies only on the fact that strikes occurred in over 400 cities in the GDR
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and that all factions had similar demands. 80 This is also why the SED charged the West
with having a hand in preparing the strikes.
What they did not take into account was the use of the radio as a means of
promulgating information about the strikes. A week before the main uprising small-scale
strikes occurred at a factory in Gotha that acted as an indicator for the large-scale
uprising to take place. The main strike started on the afternoon of June 16, in East Berlin
with construction workers protesting the introduction of the raised output quotas, not the
overthrow of the government. By the early evening big crowds had developed, with “a
band of up to 2,000 people…throwing stones at the I.V. Stalin monument at
Stalinelle…”81 During that time, anyone could walk back and forth between East and
West Berlin, so it was not hard for news to travel across to the Western sector.
When news arrived in West Berlin, GDR workers asked Radio In the American
Sector (based in West Berlin, here on RIAS) to disseminate the information over the
radio. The “accounts of what had happened in East Berlin on the sixteenth were heard by
virtually everybody in East Germany and so by 9:00am the following morning, when the
general strike was proclaimed, everybody went out on the streets.”82 RIAS sent radiocommentators to East Berlin, “where they were doing live radio-commentary in the
places where clashes between East Berliners and the People's Police occurred on the
morning on 17 June.”83
RIAS was a powerful propaganda tool for the West. At a time when most East
Germans could not afford a television, the radio was the center of attention at home. As
much as they wanted to, the SED could not prevent East Germans from listening to the
radio. East Germans received their daily news from RIAS, including news about the
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uprisings. 84 By the end of the 17th the strike in East Berlin was over. The Soviet Red
Army had successfully dispersed the crowds with their tanks, but the strikes in other parts
of the GDR continued for another two days.

37

Local Nature of Strikes
The Soviet and SED leaders did not take into account the fact that many workers
were striking about issues purely local in nature, thus discounting the theory that all the
strikers encouraged the overthrow of the government. At the Feinspinnerei in Karl-Marx
Stadt, women were striking against a Sunday night shift. Workers in a privately owned
textile company near Plauen wanted the same wages as state run factory workers. Some
groups were striking for seemingly insignificant issues like a lack of toilet paper or
serving tea in rusty urns. 85 Obviously, these workers had other demands, but the fact that
they concentrated on local grievances gives credence to the view that not all strikes were
pre-arranged and not all were specifically aimed at overthrowing the government. The
revolt was basically a worker’s uprising against the Stalinist construction of forced
socialism. Even many SED members were unhappy with this policy and the situation it
created in East Germany. The state concerns such as ‘free democratic elections’ that the
Soviets point to as proof that the West started the strikes really acted as an adhesive to try
and tie all the local strikes together to give the protesters more leverage with the SED.
Many SED members led or joined the strikes, claiming they were “dissatisfied
with the worsening living standard among the working people and justified their actions
by referring to the SED Politburo’s published admission of mistakes.”86 During the
Strikes many SED members quit the party. All over East Germany thousands of SED
members had fallen prey to mysterious or sudden sicknesses, or failed to return from
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vacations, or randomly took off their SED party badges and claimed they had forgotten or
lost them. 87 These actions served only to further embarrass the SED.
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The GDR Reaction
At first, some SED members in different localities tried to stop the strikes by
diplomatic means. While attempting to calm a group of strikers at a factory, an SED
member, the Minister of Transport and Farm Mechanical Engineering, Weinberger,
“displayed cowardice and bewilderment during the events, by signing a protocol in which
he promised to raise salaries, to establish a new vacations system, to compensate workers
for travel from residential areas to the enterprises, to pay for their staying apart from their
families, etc.”88 The strike committee at this particular factory also demanded the
dissolving of the GDR, releasing prisoners, and canceling the state of emergency, to
which the SED Minister made no objections and ended up releasing two of the strike
organizers arrested by the police. 89 More than showing their cowardice as the evidence
states, the SED members promises prove that many SED members believed the workers
had a right to strike and empathized with their anger directed at the SED.
Ironically, the uprising against Ulbricht’s forced socialism (i.e., higher output
quotas in an attempt to bring the economy back to life) cemented his position in the SED
by forcing the Soviets to stick by their divided Germany policy which Ulbricht had
masterminded. The Soviets had no idea what else could be done for the GDR. They did
not necessarily like Ulbricht or agree with his policies, but much like Matyas Rakosi in
Hungary, the Soviet’s did not have many options for a successor because Ulbricht
handled most of the workload on his own. His motto in the SED was “No one can do
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anything without me.”90 At one point SED members could not even get in touch with
Ulbricht because he ordered the telephone operators not to connect calls to him. 91
The SED members had many complaints about Ulbricht. Frederick Oelssner, an
SED member, believed Ulbricht had not understood the incorrectness of his conduct.
That he had “not understood that as a matter of fact he lost touch with the masses and that
his methods of dictatorial leadership were one of the serious reasons errors were
committed.”92 Oelssner went further and said Ulbricht was still inclined to create an
atmosphere of pomp around his person, as if he never did anything wrong. 93 But many
SED members and Soviets realized that the strikes showed the hollowness of Ulbricht’s
regime. The SED claimed its power from the strength and resolve of the workers. They
were supposed to stand as a symbol to other socialist nations as the base of socialism. But
when the workers went on strike, the hollowness of all that Ulbricht had created became
obvious. Ulbricht needed help to put down the worker's uprising.
The SED acted quickly to pre-empt the strikers from the possibility of taking over
the GDR. Initially the East German People’s Police could not handle the strikers and
failed to disperse the demonstrators. The Soviet Red Army was called in to quell the
riotous strikers with men and tanks. Martial law was declared with the intention to restore
public order and terminate the anti-government demonstrations. The most important aid
came in the form of Soviet tanks. The tanks acted as crowd dispersal units and worked as
a deterrent to people gathering in one place. One policeman said that all roads were
blocked by troops, tanks, artillery and that tanks and armored personnel carriers finished
dispersing the demonstrators. 94
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The People’s Police intentionally did not arrest many leaders of the revolt on June
17. Rather, they waited until late that night to break into their homes and arrest them so
that they could not be seen as martyrs and no one would miss them for a day or two.
Many of the strike organizers received swift punishment: military commanders
announced that death sentences had been carried out against the organizers of the
disturbances on June 18. 95
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The GDR’s Rectification Program
After the June uprising was quelled, many SED members thought the situation
could have been avoided. Oelssner “criticized the party leadership for not heeding the
signals of discontent among the populace earlier and for not understanding that this
discontent could have serious consequences.”96 Oelssner believed that the measures put
in place by the SED to improve the living standard among the workers had not yet
yielded the expected results. He believed the workers continued to take a wait and see
position, not yet trusting the party. 97
Once again SED delegates traveled to factories and promised the workers
everything they demanded. “Moreover, every official making a report considers it his
duty to surpass the promises of his predecessor. As there is no practical fulfillment of
promises, the workers have again stopped believing in them.”98 The Soviets and the SED
had come to realize that rectification was necessary. They also recognized that trust
between the SED and the workers was necessary for the party to move forward. The
workers had risen up against the government and, if the SED did not make some
concessions to the workers, the whole regime would be in danger of collapsing. Promises
for change, however, were not enough, especially because the lack of trust between the
workers and the SED still existed.
In the ensuing months the Soviets initiated measures toward revitalizing the East
German economy. By July, the Soviets talked about:
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creating a stable economic situation in the Republic and to raise the
standard of living of the GDR’s populace to that of West German’s
populace, to examine the issue of halting delivery of goods to the Soviet
Union and Poland and of counting the export of goods to the USSR as
revenue for the Soviet enterprises in the GDR from the first half of 1953
with the aim of applying these goods toward the development of the
GDR’s external trade and the satisfaction of the internal needs of the
Republic. 99

The Soviets first agreed to offer financial support in the form of an economic aid
package, similar to the Marshall Plan. The Soviets also agreed to officially terminate the
reparations payments, a main factor that had thrust East Germany into its economic
hardship. And finally, the Soviets officially announced the GDR to be a sovereign state,
further supporting the Soviet ideology of a two-Germany doctrine.
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Effects of the East German Uprising
The East German uprising acted as an icebreaker for revolting against the Soviet
repressive measures instituted in East-Central European Bloc nations during the Cold
War. One historian believed that the uprising “came to stand for a hard line repressive
resolution of internal unrest and the ultimate ratio of Soviet military intervention, and as
such was central [to] Ulbricht’s hard- line approach to crises in Eastern Europe in 1956,
1968…” The myth surrounding the uprising set the standard for other Soviet satellites to
follow. Since no hard information was readily available, rumors spread that popular
discontent was rampant in East Germany and that the people united to lash out against the
GDR. Obviously, many people were unhappy in the GDR. Other Soviet satellites heard
about the uprising and automatically inferred that the people must be trying to overthrow
the government and therefore other East-Central Bloc nations felt a common bond
between them. It was obvious to Hungary that other nations had similar problems and the
East German uprising demonstrated one way for Hungary to deal with such problems.
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Unexpected Outcome of the Uprising
The worker’s uprising also set the precedent for Soviet intervention in EastCentral Bloc nations. Much like the United States’ implementation of the Truman
Doctrine, the Soviets pursued an unspoken doctrine which allowed them to use whatever
force was necessary to keep their satellites from straying towards capitalism, as shown in
the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Czechoslovakian uprising in 1968. The
‘Brezhnev Doctrine’, as it came to be known, asserted that in a socialist society “rules
and norms of the law are subordinate to the class struggle…”100 The Soviets gave
themselves the right to intervene when any counter-revolutionary element rose up or any
time any regime was under the threat of foreign intervention. 101
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Conclusion
One of the most important problems the allies had to face post World War II was
how to deal with the defeated Germany. The division of Germany into four sections was
an attempt to ensure demilitarization and democratization of the former aggressor. But
the simplicity of the plans did not carry over into the reality of rebuilding a defeated
nation. The East/West Germany split became the front line of the Cold War between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
In the first eight years after the war ended (1945-53) Soviet controlled East
Germany became the first communist country to rebel against Stalin’s Soviet style of
socialism. The release of previously unseen archival evidence in 1992 brought forth new
theories on the causes and ramifications of the 1953 East German uprising. After viewing
internal Soviet documents sent from East Germany to Soviet Foreign Ministers and
reviewing interviews with eyewitnesses, it is clear that the 1953 East German uprising
was a worker’s revolt triggered by the ill treatment they received from the German
Democratic Republic (GDR).
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